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TRANSCRIPT
LOOKING BACK ON PENN CENTRAL:
A PANEL DISCUSSION WITH THE SUPREME
COURT LITIGATORS
Richard Lazarus: Good morning. It's an extraordinary pleasure to
be here for two reasons. The first is this is one of the few years that I
don't have to stand up here and talk about a Supreme Court case that
I lost and try to persuade you all that I won it. I also get to present
what I think must be the single most remarkable panel that we've
ever had at this conference and we've had a lot of quite remarkable
panels. To commemorate the 25 th anniversary of the
Penn Central decision, we're going to have three panels this morn-
ing, this is the first. This first panel is going to discuss the origins of
the case; sort of the making of Penn Central. The second panel is
going to talk about the larger political and social setting of the case
and its consequences for historic preservation law. And, the third is
going to look more broadly at the significance of the Penn Central
decision for takings law and constitutional law in general.
For this first panel, we have five of the most important lawyers
who played a role in producing the Court's opinion, short, of course,
of the Justices themselves. We have all three oral advocates for the
Penn Central decision. We have the former law clerk to Justice
Brennan during the October 1977 Term, and Justice Brennan, of
course, wrote the majority opinion. And we have the former law
clerk to then-Justice Rehnquist in the October 1977 Term and Justice
Rehnquist wrote the dissenting opinion.
With the benefit of hindsight we all know now what Penn Central
has become. Twenty-five years after it was decided, Penn Central is
livelier than ever. It has become the lodestar of the Court's takings
analysis. As people have found in recent years, woe to the advocate
who stands before the Court and tries to suggest a departure from the
Penn Central test. That was the fate of Rhode Island in the Palazzolo
case for trying to suggest a per se no takings test. And, that was
equally the fate of Michael Berger in the Tahoe Sierra case when he
tried to propose an expansive per se takings test. As long as Justice
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O'Connor and Justice Kennedy are the 5-Justice majority on the
Court on these issues, the Court seems well wed to Penn Central.
In Penn Central, as you all know, the Court upheld New York
City's historic landmark designation law as applied to Grand Central
Terminal. The Court concluded that there was no taking presented
on the facts of the case. The Court stressed that there was "no settled
formula" for the takings analysis, that it was ultimately a matter of
justice and fairness, and the Court declared the "parcel as a whole"
rule and rejected the "noxious use" test. The Court instead identified
three factors to be balanced to resolve the takings inquiry: the char-
acter of the governmental action, the reasonableness of investment-
backed expectations, and the economic impact. Justice Rehnquist
dissented, joined by Chief Justice Warren Burger and by Justice Ste-
vens.
To start to tell the story of Penn Central the panelists have decided
to respond to a series of questions to start a conversation going and
then hopefully open it up for you all to ask them questions as well.
We're going to start chronologically with the jurisdictional stage at
the outset and a question for Mr. Gribbon. Before beginning, let me
introduce the panel. The panel includes Leonard Koerner who is an
attorney for the City of New York and presented argument for the
City of New York in the case. We have Daniel Gribbon with Cov-
ington and Burling who presented oral argument for Penn Central.
We have Chief Judge Patricia Wald, formerly a judge on the United
States Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit, who represented the
United States in the case, and presented oral argument. We have
David Carpenter who was the law clerk for Justice Brennan. David is
at Sidley and Austin in Chicago and David and I have litigated with
and against each other in many cases in the Supreme Court. And
finally my colleague in academia, Buzz Thompson, who is a profes-
sor of law at Stanford University and someone who teaches in the
natural resources and environmental area. Professor Thompson was
a law clerk to Justice Rehnquist when Penn Central was decided.
Starting at the beginning, Mr. Gribbon when this case was begin-
ning, what strategic considerations were you thinking about in the
decision whether to seek Supreme Court review in this case?
Daniel Gribbon: Well the principal, perhaps the only, thing we
were thinking about was the decision of Judge Breitel in the New
York Court of Appeals, which broke new ground. It didn't last very
long, but it did break new ground. He had come up with a theory
that in a matter of a taking you are entitled only to the value that you
privately had added to the piece of property and are not entitled to
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the value that the public had added either by location or taxing or
something of that sort. And, in addition, he had concluded that in
the takings area the landmark designation program was so socially
and culturally beneficial to the public that instead of being entitled to
just compensation you were entitled only to any compensation that
was necessary if you were unable to make a profit from the property
that you had left. That seemed to us to be wrong in both respects
and it was for that reason that we filed a petition for a writ.
Lazarus: Was it a case where you thought it was likely review
would be granted? Were people fairly confident or did it seem more
like a long shot at the time?
Gribbon: It did not seem like a long shot to us. It seemed to us that
Judge Breitel was breaking new ground and one way or another the
Supreme Court would review it.
Lazarus: With the benefit of hindsight at the jurisdictional stage,
not at the brief-writing stage and not at the argument yet, but at the
jurisdictional stage, is there anything that you would have done dif-
ferently at all in thinking about how the case was framed.
Gribbon: I don't think so. When you win a review you are sort of
satisfied. [Laughter]
Lazarus: All right. Mr. Koerner, at the op stage when the jurisdic-
tional statement came in in the case, what was the city's reaction,
was the city surprised, did the city think this was a real threat, what
was the strategy in trying to resist review?
Koerner: To follow up with Mr. Gribbon, I think I have to give a
little historical perspective to understand why we were not surprised
that he filed a petition. Our whole argument in terms of seeking to
protect the landmark legislation was to treat this as just another exer-
cise of the police power similar to zoning. There had been a deci-
sion by the Supreme Court in the Euclid case, about 50 years before,
which said essentially that government can regulate through zoning.
As a consequence, what we tried to do was say, well, if you can
regulate through zoning, this is no different other than it is a differ-
ent type of land use in that when you look at what the city was trying
to do, take all its individual designations, put them together with the
designations of historic districts, you have a comprehensive plan. So
you have a comprehensive plan for landmarks just as you do for zon-
ing, and then the test is not whether they can make the highest and
best use but whether or not they can make a reasonable rate of return
on the property as limited, just as an owner in a particular zoned area
would have to do and he would not be entitled to the highest and
best use. We then analyzed what they could do. We showed with the
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use of air rights, which I can discuss later, that they were able to
make a reasonable rate of return and that is how we submitted the
case to the highest court of the state of New York. And we thought
that was a pretty good argument.
But as Mr. Gribbon indicated, Judge Breitel, who was the most
powerful judge in the state, had other ideas. He must have read
about this economist Henry George. I don't know where he got this
theory from but he developed a theory in the opinion which essen-
tially said that Penn Central in the ownership of Grand Central ter-
minal had received many benefits from the government in setting up
the railroad operation, such as for example it was submerged for the
first time which enabled Park Avenue to be developed. As a conse-
quence Penn Central was able to buy the property and then develop
it through the use of hotels and make a profit on the hotels. Judge
Breitel felt that that showed that Penn Central was benefitting from
the property. Unfortunately that had nothing to do with the terminal
in 1977. And he went on for pages about this.
The other thing which he said which was troubling is that it was
not a zoning case, that we had singled out Penn Central's property,
Grand Central terminal. That is precisely the opposite approach of
what we wanted. We wanted to say we weren't singling out any-
body, that the benefits and the burdens were being shared equally
throughout the entire city, that everybody including the owners of
Grand Central were benefitting by having all these landmarks, and to
single out someone we said would be wrong and that is not what we
are doing. But Judge Breitel felt we were singling them out but nev-
ertheless found, because of Henry George, who I later spent more
time looking up after the case was decided, that Penn Central was
not harmed. [Laughter]
The other point Breitel emphasized was that he said the city at this
period was in fiscal distress, which was true. He seemed to indicate
that because of the fiscal stress we would be able to use a regulatory
power, that is the police power, rather than the condemnation power.
Obviously that's not a principle that can work. Either you can regu-
late or you can't regulate; it cannot depend on the finances of the
city. That was a problem.
So that when we saw this opinion, Dorothy Miner (the illustrious
counsel of Landmarks) and I both realized that this case was going
beyond the state court of appeals. And so when Mr. Gribbon filed
his petition I did what all lawyers do, I said to the Supreme Court it
was just a routine application and, you know, hoped for the best. It
took the case. [Laughter]
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Lazarus: In the opposition, did the city start to distance itself from
the lower court's analysis?
Koerner: Yes. We wrote a piece in the brief in which we com-
pletely objected to Judge Breitel's position. As a consequence, be-
fore we did that, since he was so powerful in New York, and since as
an institutional litigator we would do 30 cases or more a year in the
state court of appeals at that time, I had to write him a letter and I
explained that while we loved what he did we really couldn't urge it
on the Supreme Court. [Laughter]
Lazarus: And this is at the jurisdictional stage, this is before review
is granted?
Koerner: This was before review when I had to write the response,
yes.
Lazarus: All right. The Court grants, actually let me, I don't know
whether either David or Buzz, I didn't plan to ask you any questions
at the jurisdictional stage, anything you would feel free to talk about
it?
Carpenter: It was one of the few cases Justice Brennan talked
about with me and his other law clerks at the jurisdictional stage.
During the term, he handled all the cert. petitions and jurisdictional
statements in appeals entirely himself, and actually I think the Penn
Central case was an appeal.
Lazarus: You're right it was an appeal.
Carpenter: And he did mention this case to us at the jurisdictional
stage. He said that sooner or later we're going to have to take one of
these landmark zoning cases, and he read to us from the jurisdic-
tional statement during one of our daily meetings. But that's really
all I remember at this stage.
Thompson: Because the Justice that I clerked for is still on the
bench, I cannot talk too much about what actually went on in the
chambers of the Court as a whole. But I can give you my own im-
pression, which is that this is probably a case that would have been
heard even if it hadn't been for Judge Breitel's decision. But that
certainly helped. It was one of those decisions that just called out for
Supreme Court review. From an academic standpoint I have to say,
though, that of all of the opinions that were written in the Penn Cen-
tral case, Breitel's is the most interesting. It's the one decision that
really sort of broke new ground and raised some very, very interest-
ing issues that the courts still are dealing with.
Lazarus: All right, moving to the briefing on the merits, Mr. Grib-
bon in approaching the brief what was essentially Penn Central's
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strategy in trying to frame the issue and presenting the case to the
Court in the briefing on the merits?
Gribbon: Well essentially it was to attack Judge Breitel's decision
because we thought once we got that out of the way it was fairly
clear sailing, that there had been a taking of our air rights which
were an essential part of our property interest, and we were entitled
to just compensation. Not very complicated.
Lazarus: And in terms of the response, obviously, Mr. Koerner you
had already shown that you were going to abandon Judge Breitel's
analysis. So you actually had to come up with an entirely new con-
struct, maybe what you had argued below. What was the City's
strategy for winning the case before the Court?
Koerner: Mr. Gribbon's approach was essentially, as he indicated,
that there had been a taking and therefore they were entitled to the
highest and best use. In the state court system there was more of a
discussion about whether or not, even as regulated, Penn Central
could earn a reasonable rate of return. So this was a slight change
and he was going for all of the booty, treating this essentially as a
condemnation, so what we tried to emphasize were the benefits that
we had given the owners of Grand Central terminal which included
the ability to transfer air rights, which was a relatively new concept,
but essentially what that means is that any unused air rights over the
terminal could be transferred to other properties. The planning
commission, with the aiding and abetting again of Dorothy Miner
and Landmarks Preservation, had made two amendments which
made it easier for the owners of Grand Central terminal to transfer
those air rights. They had removed a limitation on any particular site,
which had been a maximum of 20 percent, and they increased the
number of sites to which they could be transferred. And essentially
what we argued was that was a very valuable resource.
We also pointed out that they could develop the station and make it
more commercially viable and they did not do that. It was their bur-
den to show that it was not viable. And essentially we wanted again
to bring the Supreme Court back to the principles that they had al-
ready used in examining police power regulatory takings case. Be-
cause we understood that, particularly coming from New York, if we
tried to jab a new theory into the Supreme Court to support our posi-
tion, we would be in a precarious position. When you look at what
we did 25 years later, and we'll discuss this later of course, it's well
settled, but then what we essentially said to Penn Central was you
can't build this 55-story building even though the zoning permits it
and even though right next door Pan Am had already done precisely
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that. So when you view it from the simplistic perspective, one would
say that Mr. Gribbon had a very powerful argument. So we had to
show that we were dealing with him equitably. We wanted the Court
to go away with the impression that we were trying to be fair. And
that really was our approach.
Lazarus: Was there a takings test that you were advocating in the
brief?
Koerner: Well I know this is a takings conference but our whole
argument was that there was no taking. Instead what we were saying
was a taking would only occur if the appellant satisfied its burden of
showing that it could not earn a reasonable rate of return and what
we essentially said was given an opportunity in the trial court they
did not do that.
Lazarus: So your focus was "reasonable return" as a touchstone for
takings. Once review was granted, was there a lot of involvement
with amicus?
Koerner: Yes, that was more handled by Dorothy Miner who was
the counsel to Landmarks Preservation and she was the one who
rounded up the amicus briefs. The State of New York filed one, the
Municipal Arts Society, the National Trust for Historic Preservation,
all put in briefs in support. As Mr. Gribbon pointed out in oral ar-
gument, we won on numbers in terms of amicus briefs. [Laughter]
Lazarus: Judge Wald, you were working for the Department of
Justice at the time, where you were the Assistant Attorney General
for the Office of Legislation. Do you recall how and why the United
States decided to file an amicus brief in the case? These days they
seem to file briefs in every case before the Court. But they didn't do
that back then.
Wald: I always felt I played a very anomalous role in this whole
litigation. I was the assistant attorney general for legislation. It was
not a litigating division and although I had had some litigating ex-
perience, a fair amount before I took that job, I certainly didn't have
any in the job. I had no relationship with the lands and natural re-
sources division except in terms of their legislative priorities.
One day Wade McCree who was the Solicitor General at the time
came to see me. And he said you know there is a tradition in this
department that all heads, all assistant attorneys general, this is 1978,
get to argue one case in the Supreme Court. And I said at the time I
was busy, I think I was trying to get FISA passed which was the for-
eign intelligence act and an omnibus judgeship bill to get President
Carter 150 new judges, etc. So he said we think we have a good one
for you to argue. It was a little bit like a barrister being called in and
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the brief is already written and indeed the brief had already been
written by the lands and natural resources division. So they gave me
the brief and in retrospect I was certainly a bit of a dummy, I think,
in terms of the merits of the case. They gave me a brief and I read it
and read the cases, etc. And then Frank Easterbrook, who was then
the Deputy Solicitor General, came to see me for 15 minutes. I think
he had somebody with him but I don't remember who it was, from
lands and natural resources. I don't even remember what they talked
about, but it wasn't anything very much pointed in terms of what I
would say at the oral argument or what points I would raise.
Subsequently, I talked with Lois Schiffer, a good friend of mine,
who in the Clinton administration became the head of the lands and
natural resources division and was at this time the head of the gen-
eral litigation part of the division. She said, my god, they didn't
even moot court you. No, there was no moot court. She said nowa-
days if you get to do a Supreme Court argument you get four moot
courts, etc. I had never argued in the Supreme Court before either.
It was a little bit of babe in the woods. So I asked her, seeing as how
I was not present at the creation of the brief or any of the strategy
that went into it, I asked her subsequently when this panel came up,
if she could go back in her memory and remember some of the
background. She said that they had gotten a letter from the National
Trust asking them wouldn't they like to come in and do it, and she
said you know in general they decided that they would but she re-
ferred to it as a quote ho hum case. [Laughter] I said, well, was
there any dispute about what kind of, of what attitude you would
take, what points you would make, and she said she didn't remember
much about the brief at all. She was the head of the litigation section,
but she couldn't remember whether or not she had even reviewed it.
But she said one question was, did the U.S. actually have any rele-
vant interest in this seeing as how these are primarily state and lo-
cally administered programs. And so there was a little question
about whether the U.S. really did have a pertinent interest. They
decided that it had, but there was no significant dispute inside the
department about what attitude they would take or anything else.
And so that's how it came to be. Well I'll let it stay there.
Lazarus: At the merits stage Buzz and David, what do you recol-
lect of your own, not your Justices', your own sort of preliminary
assessment of the case when you read it. Buzz.
Thompson: One of the things you have to realize at this point in
time, going back 25 years, is that at that stage the Supreme Court's
takings jurisprudence was pretty much a mess. It probably still is a
[VOL. XV
LOOKING BACK ON PENN CENTRAL
mess, but it's a different mess today than it was 25 years ago. There
were a lot of decisions out there, but there wasn't much in the way of
a coherent approach that the Court had taken to takings cases. In
addition to that, this was the first in a series of new types of govern-
mental regulations. This was the beginning of the historic preserva-
tion period. The courts hadn't faced laws such as the Endangered
Species Act yet. And so one of the difficult things in thinking about
this case at the time was how to take this very unformed jurispru-
dence and apply it to a totally new field. With that in mind, though,
what concerned me most at the time and still concerns me the most
was the size of the imposition, the burden, that was placed on Penn
Central compared to what the potential benefits were to Penn Cen-
tral. This is the reciprocity of advantage issue, and for that reason I
thought that there was probably a fair prospect at that point in time
that the Court was going to reverse the New York courts.
Lazarus: David do you have any recollections?
Carpenter: My initial reaction to the case was simple: I was
trained to think that very, very few things should be takings, and I
thought this was a law that should be upheld. That said, I had no il-
lusions that the court would necessarily see the case that way. As a
law clerk, there were lots of cases that I thought should be decided
certain ways and the Court sometimes decided them differently.
[Laughter] One thing going in, I thought this was a reasonably im-
portant case but less important than a lot of the other cases that we
had that term. I certainly never thought this was a case that we
would be sitting around talking about 25 years later.
Lazarus: At the oral argument, Mr. Gribbon what are your recol-
lections of what happened at the oral argument? When you think
back to the oral argument, looking back to the transcript now years
later, do you have any reactions? Most surprising moments of the
argument? Worst moments? Best moments?
Gribbon: I can easily respond to the most surprising moment. I
was well into my argument when Justice Marshall, who usually
doesn't take much interest in matters of this kind, he was slumped
back in his chair, he suddenly came forward almost stood up and
said: how did you get this property in the first place, did you steal it
fair and square. [Laughter] Before I had recovered sufficiently to
say anything, he had slumped back in his chair and never showed
any interest in the argument thereafter. [Laughter] But I suppose, of
equal importance, I was going as well as I could at Judge Breitel's
opinion, feeling that was our best chance if we could knock that off.
It is true that the city of New York had more or less disavowed it and
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none of the many amici had argued in favor of it, but it still seemed
to me to be worth a shot, so I was arguing away when Justice Ste-
vens more or less waved me off. He said don't pay any attention to
that or something to that effect. So there was basically the main ar-
gument that I had intended to make and he said they weren't going to
pay much attention to that. Well he was wrong in the sense that they
did adopt, the majority did, one half of Breitel's opinion, that is the
notion that if we could make a reasonable earning on what was left
that there had been no taking. Now that was novel as far as I was
concerned and Breitel said it and in the majority opinion they
adopted it even though Justice Stevens said they weren't going to
pay much attention to the New York decision.
Lazarus: Mr. Koerner what are your recollections?
Koemer: Well, like Mr. Gribbon, I was extremely pleased that our
rejection of Judge Breitel's rationale was accepted by the Court
without any discussion because I was prepared to discuss it ad nau-
seam. But I was afraid it would be a diversion from what we wanted
to achieve. On the other hand, there was a lot of discussion about
singling out Grand Central terminal so I didn't know how to read the
justices' minds except for Justice Marshall who, as Mr. Gribbon in-
dicated, seemed to be supportive of our position. [Laughter] We had
this comprehensive plan argument but as I indicated earlier in this
conversation people still had a hard time with it. All the judges we
argued before had a hard time understanding why we were not sin-
gling out Grand Central terminal when in it's in the middle of a busi-
ness district. And, psychologically, this case was a big change be-
cause prior to it most of our designations were received with ap-
proval by the people who owned the properties. Historically, district
litigation involving such areas as Brooklyn Heights, the people who
lived in these areas liked the designations. They believed it helped
their property values. The problem here is that Grand Central termi-
nal is clearly being curtailed substantially and the judges were very
troubled by it. We emphasized the comprehensive plan, I thought I
made some inroads, but then they would come back and ask me
again about individual properties and they were particularly con-
cerned with a church and what we would do. And they asked Mr.
Gribbon, if the church decided to close down and move outside the
district and we both gave answers that essentially they could do that.
Interestingly enough, that may not be the answer now, but they had a
lot of trouble with the individual designations. So I didn't know how
to read it. I mean we tried to emphasize the comprehensive plan
and, more importantly, they did seem to accept the value of air rights
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which was a new concept in the Supreme Court, that that was some-
thing of value and could be considered.
The one difference I have with Mr. Gribbon, I don't think they
adopted Judge Breitel's opinion. I think what they did, they just ap-
plied the zoning test and when Justice Brennan wrote his opinion I
think he was just applying the reasonable rate of return in saying that
you have to look at everything. One thing that the opinion picked up,
for which I give a lot of credit to the clerks in the Supreme Court, is
the fact that Judge Breitel said to the owners of Grand Central termi-
nal, I know I set forth this standard, if you think under this standard
you can make a showing, go back to the Supreme Court and they
will be obligated to review it. And Justice Brennan in his opinion
specifically noted that, that if they could show that there was a hard-
ship they could still go back there at any time. Now, I think that was
helpful to us and they picked up on it.
Lazarus: Were there any surprising moments for you at the argu-
ment? Any answer you gave you wished you could take back?
Koerner: The one thing I thought about was, they asked me what if
Penn Central stopped operating the terminal, and I glibly said well
that would be a different case and they probably would have shown a
hardship. Obviously, in retrospect, I'm not sure that should have
been the answer. Because what we would say now is that if they
wanted to leave the terminal that doesn't mean they discharged their
obligation. If the terminal could be used as a discotheque or a Union
Station model, as you know where you have all those stores, maybe
they can still earn a reasonable rate of return. So I might have just
been too quick to close down the terminal. That's the one thing I've
thought about.
Lazarus: Judge Wald, your recollections of the argument.
Wald: Well, when I reread it the first thing that struck me was the
cultural difference because they referred to me throughout the argu-
ment as Mrs. Wald. And that was the way. Indeed in those early
days, that wasn't that early, but if you were a married woman it was
always Mrs. Wald. Now of course that wouldn't happen. Everybody
is Ms.
But sure enough I thought it was interesting because one of the
first questions I got in my brief period arguing as an amicus was ex-
actly the one thing that I mentioned that the Justice Department wor-
ried a little bit about, what interest does the United States have in
this case. We had to answer of course that the United States had no
program where they directly imposed these kinds of restrictions for
landmark provisions. I went through the rigamarole about all of the
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national landmarks but they were grants and aids and tax credits, etc.
etc. One of the Justices asked you know very directly but has the
United States ever imposed directly restrictions like this for land-
mark purposes and of course I had to answer no.
The rest of my argument it seemed to me was like the tail wagging
the dog or the tail of the dog after Mr. Koerner's argument because
they just kept going with the hypotheticals. They had the St. John's
Church across from Lafayette Park and if they wanted to move out
into the suburbs and could they sell it to a supermarket, etc. And
then the other one, which was a little bit tougher, was well out in
Manassas there is a battlefield, you know the Manassas battlefield is
on a farmer's piece of property which they suddenly decide is de-
fined as a Civil War landmark or has Civil War relics on it. And he
wants to sell it for development, can he do that? Does he have to
keep it just as a farm indefinitely? And so that seemed to go on and
on and on.
I did want to mention because you didn't ask me about the U.S.
brief because there are a couple of things in looking back that are
kind of interesting. As both the earlier speakers said, the U.S. took
the line that this was not a takings so long as a reasonable use was
allowed. Then also the question came up about the divisability of
property, an issue which is still with us. And they took the line that
the property was not divisible for analytical purposes, you couldn't
take one piece off and say that's a taking of that particular piece.
Then they said this is like zoning, which I must admit as I read
through, and I really was a neophyte in the field, I did have the ho
hum attitude a little bit. Like, well my God, just because all the
landmarks are not in one part of the city which had been set aside as
a landmark division of the city, like New Orleans, etc. just because
they are scattered around the different places, didn't seem to me to
be a real difference. Although the U.S. did put in its brief and this is
the reason I bring it up, it put in a sentence that said they admitted
that this picking out of landmarks quote may create opportunities for
arbitrariness not present in broad area zoning, Mr. Gribbon, I re-
member, picked up on this either in his reply brief or at oral argu-
ment. But the other thing that I remember kind of amusingly be-
cause Easterbrook had been down to see me as the deputy solicitor
was, there is a big footnote in the U.S. brief from Posner. Posner
and Easterbrook later became of course the economics and law
types, but the U.S. was citing, thinking it was in its favor obviously,
a Posner analysis which they said showed that basically what had
happened here was like a non-monetary landmark tax on it, etc. So
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that's basically it. I just remember breathing a huge sight of relief
when my time was up. [Laughter]
Lazarus: Like the reference to Mrs. Wald, the transcript also shows
the Justices referring to each other as Brother, as Brother Rehnquist.
And once O'Connor was on the Court all that quickly left their rheto-
ric. David, what are your recollections of the argument in general
and do you have any sense that the argument made a difference in
this case?
Carpenter: Well three things were significant at the argument. Pre-
liminarily, from a law clerk's perspective, the main importance of
oral argument was that it was an opportunity to get a sense of what
the other Justices thought about the case. This case was exceptional
in that it was very well argued on both sides. That wasn't true of
most Supreme Court arguments during this term. So, generally, the
value of attending the oral argument was seeing the questions that
the other Justices asked and what things concerned them. And three
things turned out to be significant to the opinion that occurred at the
oral argument. First, very early in Mr. Gribbon's argument Justice
Stewart pressed him very hard on how this was any different than
zoning. Justice Stewart said that height limitations are perfectly
valid in the zoning context, and the effect on the property owner is
the same whether the restriction results from zoning that applies to
everyone or historic landmark law that applies just to you. He didn't
see how it made any difference in terms of the Takings Clause that
landmark zoning was involved and he thought the real problem, if
any, was one of discrimination, almost equal protection. And there
the obvious answer was to talk about the concept of average recip-
rocity of advantage, which Mr. Gribbon did, but Justice Stewart just
wasn't buying it. He didn't view that concept as important to the
law of takings. And that was one thing that turned out to be signifi-
cant in the preparation of the opinion.
The second thing is that Justice Powell and I think Mr. Koerner
was alluding to this, pressed very hard on what would happen if cir-
cumstances changed and it turned out that Penn Central was unable
to use the terminal in the railroad business. He was very concerned
whether Penn Central would have an opportunity to come in and get
relief if circumstances changed, such that use of the terminal in its
present form became uneconomic. That concern was subsequently
reflected in the opinion, I think in a footnote.
And there was a third thing that was significant which related to
the way Penn Central had argued the case. It had presented a syllo-
gism: air rights are property, this takes away air rights, therefore it's
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a taking. But the original plan for the terminal had included an office
tower, not the 55 stories or whatever was proposed in the case, but I
think 20 stories. A question was asked whether there was anything
in what the Landmark Commission had done that would indicate that
they would have disapproved a lesser-sized structure more along the
lines of the original plan. And Mr. Gribbon was forced to acknowl-
edge that there wasn't. And that was significant too because it meant
that to a great extent the characterization of the law as having taken
away all the air rights above the terminal really wasn't accurate and
that too was reflected in the opinion.
Lazarus: Buzz, what are your recollections of the argument and
your sense, if any, whether the oral argument affected the results in
this case.
Thompson: My memory of the oral argument 25 years ago was
that it was an extremely spirited and very humorous oral argument
where the Justices were very engaged and argued back and forth
with each other. Reading the transcript reminds me, first of all, of
how funny a lot of the questions were that the various Justices asked.
Earlier we were regaled by the question by Justice Marshall. Daniel
Gribbon had only begun talking and had noted that New York City
was the greatest city in the world when Justice Rehnquist said, "Well
how are you measuring greatest, in terms of population, or are you
measuring in terms of total taxes?" [Laughter] And you see that
throughout. I really urge you to read the transcript that is in your
materials. In addition, you can also get an audio file of the entire
oral argument on the Internet. You just go on the Internet and search
for "Penn Central oral argument." You can listen to the entire argu-
ment which is nice because you can actually begin to tell which of
the various Justices are speaking.
As I mentioned, the other thing I remember was the Justices were
very engaged. They asked a large number of hypotheticals and when
you go back now, you realize that the oral argument was really a
rehearsal for a number of the cases that have come since Penn Cen-
tral. There were several hypotheticals that were basically the Lucas
facts. One of the Lucas hypotheticals was presented to Leonard Ko-
erner and, if I'm not mistaken in my reading of the transcript, Ko-
erner agreed that in the Lucas-type situation there would be a taking,
because the property in those cases would not be economically pro-
ductive. There was also another question that I think came from Jus-
tice Stevens: if there was a taking in this particular case, when did
the taking occur? Did the taking occur at the time the landmark was
designated, or not until the later point in time when the Penn Central
[VOL. XV
LOOKING BACK ON PENN CENTRAL
corporation asked to build on top of Grand Central station? So there
were a lot of issues that came up that we've seen in the last 25 years.
In terms of the importance of this oral argument, I don't think that
the oral argument probably ultimately swayed any of the Justices.
But I think it was an oral argument that could have been extremely
important. The ultimate issue, as I think a number of the panelists
have suggested, was whether or not this case was any different than
your standard zoning case. The way in which Penn Central ulti-
mately had to distinguish those zoning cases was to argue that Penn
Central had been singled out here. And there were two parts of that
argument. One of them was the reciprocity of advantage argument:
Penn Central was bearing a burden that was much greater than the
benefits it was going to receive, and therefore this case was very dif-
ferent than your typical zoning case. The second was the discrimina-
tion argument. And I always thought the discrimination argument
was a losing argument because this was a situation where there was a
landmarks commission that applied a set of standards that was sub-
ject to judicial review. I don't think that the lawyers, looking back at
the oral argument, ever clearly differentiated between these two ar-
guments. I would have pushed a lot harder on the reciprocity of ad-
vantage argument in comparison to the discrimination argument.
Lazarus: After the conference, David, Justice Brennan is going to
be writing the majority opinion. What are you recollections of the
opinion-writing process, and I mean those you can share, versus
those that you can't share in terms of what you were thinking about
when you were assigned to draft the opinion and what you were try-
ing to accomplish?
Carpenter: At that point in time the Supreme Court decided or
gave plenary consideration to about 160 cases and about probably
half to two-thirds of them came down after May 1 st. And the month
of May was simply a nightmare for law clerks; it was like sleepwalk-
ing. A Supreme Court policeman told me he'd seen clerks walking
down the halls, almost in a trance, talking to themselves during May
of many terms. [Laughter] And I remember having experiences a
lot like that. After the conference it was very apparent to me that it
was going to be a very, very hard opinion to write because different
things were important to different Justices. Justice Brennan told me
that it should be a very long opinion, but one of Justice Stewart's
clerks told me that you better not say anything and should make the
opinion very, very narrow. [Laughter]. Any Supreme Court opinion
is a formidable thing to undertake, but this was certainly the hardest
one that I worked on.
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There was a rule that you had to get court opinions circulated by
the end of the first week of June. This case was argued in April so
there wasn't that much time to do it, given that I remember that I
probably spent about two weeks just researching and reading. In
addition to studying the briefs and the record and reading all the
Court's taking opinions, I read many law review articles about his-
toric preservation, a lot of that was reflected in the first part of the
opinion. And while I was working some on other opinions at the
time, I spent probably two weeks trying to draft and redraft the opin-
ion - trying to get the concepts down and trying to find an organiza-
tion that worked in terms of reflecting all of what seemed to have
been important to each Justice in the majority. But it came together
and was basically written Memorial Day weekend in three consecu-
tive near all-nighters. Justice Brennan had very much wanted to get
the opinion to work on during Memorial Day. He was an early riser
who took walks early each morning, and I delivered the draft to his
house at 5:30 in the morning Memorial Day just as I think he was
coming back from his walk. And then he worked on the opinion,
worked his magic on it that day and gave his marked-up version of it
back to me Tuesday. There were lots of footnotes to fill in and the
like, which I did over the course of the next two days, and the Justice
went over it again on Thursday and we circulated the draft opinion to
the other Justices on Friday morning, June 2 nd. Now I had been talk-
ing to Buzz during the course of the opinion writing process and I
knew he'd started work on a draft dissent and I'd expected a dissent
to come around the next week. But within an hour or two after the
circulation of the draft majority opinion, we received the circulation
copies of Rehnquist's draft dissent. I was physically exhausted and I
now was very apprehensive. I told the Justice that Rehnquist had
been lying in wait. Now Justice Brennan was the nicest man I've
ever known and very fatherly, grandfatherly. He put his arm around
me and said don't worry it doesn't touch us, and he made me sit
down and read the dissent - and he sat next to me while I read it. I
must say I read the dissent and I thought it did touch us. [Laughter]
But I was very glad that the Justice thought it didn't touch us.
Thompson: For most Justices, May is really a horrible period; cer-
tainly for the law clerks it is. It was not a horrible period in the
Rehnquist chambers. Rehnquist had a ten-day rule that nothing could
stay on your desk for longer than ten days. As a result, we were ba-
sically finished with things long before the other Justices would is-
sue their various opinions. We would have gotten the dissenting
opinion out even faster except that Justice Rehnquist thought that he
[VOL. XV
LOOKING BACK ON PENN CENTRAL
should have at least have one or two footnotes that referenced the
majority opinion. [Laughter]
Carpenter: That was the fastest the entire term I think in terms of
the dissent being circulated following the circulation of the draft ma-
jority.
Lazarus: In terms of when you saw the draft majority opinion,
what was your feeling about the potential vulnerabilities, the poten-
tial for actually switching the Court or not.
Thompson: Until all the Justices signed on, I thought there was the
potential for this case to go either way. I think this was a very, very
close case. There were a number of Justices who were concerned
about the impact on Penn Central of the landmark designation. I
think there was also a notion that, no matter how amorphous the
concept of nuisance (the idea that you shouldn't have to compensate
somebody if you prevent them from engaging in a harm but you
should have to compensate them if you are asking them to do some-
thing beneficial), this was one of those cases in which it was very
hard to see what Penn Central had done wrong. In other words, why
was it that Penn Central was "being penalized" in this particular
situation? The only thing Penn Central had done was build a really
great building that everyone liked. Those sort of issues bothered the
Justices on one side. But on the other side, they didn't want to do
anything which could undermine the constitutionality of zoning.
They didn't want to get into a situation where governments would
have to compensate property owners in a normal zoning case, and
the hypothetical that Justice Stewart asked at the very beginning of
the oral argument really highlighted the potential dilemma. Justice
Stewart asked what would happen if there was a zoning regulation
that had prevented Penn Central from building anything taller than
Grand Central Station? Would Penn Central be entitled to compen-
sation in that particular setting? The Justices were very concerned
about the potential implications of ruling for Penn Central in a vari-
ety of other contexts. For that reason, the case could have gone ei-
ther way.
Lazarus: Justice Stevens dissented, which is such a surprise to the
rest of us today. Since then, Justice Stevens has been the main op-
ponent of an aggressive view of the takings clause.
Carpenter: I thought at the time the majority opinion may well
have in fact persuaded Justice Stevens, but that he may have wanted
the case to come out 6-3 rather than 7-2 because he thought it was a
tough issue for the reasons that Buzz has identified and thought it
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looked better coming out 6-3. In any case, he certainly followed
Penn Central enthusiastically thereafter.
Thompson: It's certainly tough to reconcile Justice Stevens' more
recent opinions with his joining Justice Rehnquist's dissent in the
Penn Central case. This was, again, the very early stage in the de-
velopment of modem takings jurisprudence. And all of the Justices
were looking around for ways of trying to think their way through a
series of takings cases. So Stevens at this stage was, I think, very
interested in questions of proportionality and justice and whether or
not in this particular case there might have been other ways in which
New York City could have made Penn Central whole. Looking at
the oral argument of Judge Wald, there was a series of questions that
Justice Stevens asked in which he was very interested in whether or
not the federal government had ever engaged in historic preservation
without providing compensation. And I believe he was absolutely
convinced that there was a variety of cities and states around the na-
tion that had found other approaches to historic preservation that
wouldn't have forced this type of takings issue to come up before the
courts.
Lazarus: One thing I've always thought about the case - and I was
just curious if you all or anyone wanted to speculate about it - is that
if this case hadn't involved Grand Central Terminal, that if it in-
volved a significant building in terms of economics but in fact not an
historic landmark with which the Justices were all familiar, that the
case would have come out differently. That it might well have gone
the other way. The fact that it was Grand Central Terminal, some-
thing that the Justices were aware of, that they were sort of naturally
sympathetic to it, made them a little more willing to assume that this
is something that the city really needed to do. That fact made a Jus-
tice like Justice Powell, who otherwise was always after that on the
other side of the taking issue, more favorably inclined to the City.
Carpenter: That could have in some sense made it easier for them
to reject the taking claim. But it also meant that the dollars involved
were so very large. I didn't view it as the ideal set of facts to be
writing an opinion saying there was no taking because the dollars
were so large.
Thompson: I would agree with Dave on that. It was not the ideal
case. At the same time I don't think another case would have come
up because if it had involved something less than Grand Central sta-
tion, if it had involved a situation where there was an economic im-
pact on a small property owner, then I think New York City would
have found a way to resolve it without going to the Supreme Court.
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Lazarus: I gather that, you were telling me yesterday that Jackie
Kennedy and a group were demonstrating in front of the Court dur-
ing the argument.
Carpenter: Jackie Kennedy organized a train trip down from New
York City and there was a demonstration in front of the Supreme
Court, I think, the Sunday before the case was argued.
Lazarus: Are you surprised Mr. Koerner, Mr. Gribbon, are you all
surprised by the fact that, 25 years later, this case has become such a
significant takings precedent?
Koerner: We knew it was significant at least for New York state
because if it had gone the other way it really would have stopped
landmarks preservation in its tracks. What's interesting is what has
happened since then and in my short paper I cite a number of cases
just to show you the variety of designations. For example, in two
significant cases, one in the Second Circuit and one in the Court of
Appeals, religious organizations sought to challenge designations
where they contended that their mission would be interfered with if
they were not allowed in each case to destroy a building and do high
rise development so that they would be able to expand their invest-
ments and get more money for their mission. Now, based on the
church discussion that we all mentioned in the Supreme Court, one
could conclude that any time a charitable organization says they
want to expand they ought to be allowed to do that because other-
wise you are interfering with their religious mission. And that in-
deed was a holding early on in the Lutheran church case before Penn
Central. But these cases went the other way. The designations were
upheld, the courts looked very closely at what the charitable organi-
zations were saying and essentially what they said was you may
have a little less money but you can still do your mission. And later
on we were able to do some historical designations. There was one
building on Broadway where Matthew Brady, a famous 19 th century
photographer, was for a fleeting moment in the building and we were
able to preserve it. [Laughter] And essentially now the designation
process is so instilled, this decision has had such momentum, that it's
really now a heavy lift for an owner of a building to attack a designa-
tion. And I think landmarks at least in New York is pretty well en-
trenched.
Lazarus: Mr. Gribbon.
Gribbon: Yes, I am surprised that the decision has taken on such
importance. At the time it was important but I didn't think it was of
the cosmic importance which it turned out to be. Let me just go on
to say that I have considered what I might have done differently. I
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think that was one of the questions that you put to us. And I haven't
for the life of me come up with any magic bullet that would have
changed things. I don't think there was anything that I or anyone
else for that matter could have said that would have persuaded Jus-
tices Brennan and Marshall. I was disappointed that some of the
other Justices didn't come along and while I don't have any major
matter there are a couple of points of emphasis that I think I failed
on.
One, I think I let the argument become a question of whether the
landmark program was socially desirable or not. Those demonstra-
tors that were referred to, Jackie Kennedy Onassis and the vice
president's wife, they didn't care who paid for this, all they wanted
was to make sure that the landmark program continued. And Justice
Brennan in his opinion asserted that if
Penn Central won this case it would be the end of the landmark
program, which was wrong. As the dissent pointed out, there were a
number of other ways that state and local governments had worked
this out. I think the basic argument, although it wasn't articulated,
really came down to whether the Court was going to stand in the
way of landmark designations rather than who should pay for it. On
the matter of who should pay for it, the chairman of the Landmark
Commission said we have created a public park over Grand Central.
And that's great but who is supposed to pay for it, Penn Central or
the public.
The second point where I think I made a mistake was in not argu-
ing the notion that air rights are a very important and discrete part of
a property interest. Today I think that is well established. But at that
time, 25 years ago, air rights were sort of mysterious and the court of
appeals in New York had said they really don't amount to very
much. And I think had I been able to persuade the lawyers on the
Court that these air rights were just as important a part of property as
an acre of ground or a wing of a building the decision could possibly
have been different. It seemed to me that our case came down to the
example which I put to them which was if a farmer has a 100-acre
farm which has increased in value way beyond his investment expec-
tations and two acres are taken to build a public road, it is no answer
for the government to say well you can make a living out of remain-
ing 98 acres so we don't need to pay you anything for the two that
we took. It's perfectly clear that the government would have to pay
the fair value of those two acres and I think I just failed to establish
to the Court that air rights were just as discrete and important a part
of property as an acre of ground.
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Lazarus: Judge Wald, are you surprised by the significance of the
case 25 years later?
Wald: I certainly didn't recognize the significance, maybe because
I wasn't a regular player in that field at the time. In discussing it
with a few people before this panel I know, let's just say an activist
type described it as enormously important because, as he perceived
it, it was the beginning of the movement, this is the late 70s, which
was just getting started to try to make it very expensive for govern-
ment to regulate in different fields, not just landmarks, and that had
it gone the other way the notion would have been that you could
have used the power much less frequently and with a lot more em-
phasis on how much it costs. This was the beginning, in this per-
son's perception, the beginning of the attempt to turn around various
doctrines, not just the takings doctrine but as we know many of the
assaults upon other kinds of regulation. So I think in retrospect it
was a kind of braking case, I mean it put on the brakes, this is where
we stop at least for the moment. I'm sure it would have driven later
Justices, and did drive later Justices who went in different directions,
mad, like Justice Scalia, because he has said many times he dislikes
balancing tests and where you have a lot of criteria you say to the
courts below, look here are 10 criteria balance them all around and
come up with an answer. And there was a little bit of that in this
decision.
The lesson I think I took away from it goes back to Judge Breitel's
opinion below. If you are going to innovate as a judge, if you are
going to introduce an innovative theory, you have to be very careful.
You have to go very slow because it is almost in the nature of the
judiciary when they see something that is, if you are on a lower
court, if on the Supreme Court I guess you can do anything you
want, but if you are on a lower court and it's going to go up there,
then you have to be very careful. Write a law review article about
your innovative theory but otherwise you are flaunting the gods as it
were. [Laughter]
Lazarus: David, there you are in your Justice's chambers in May of
'78, any sense at all then of the potential significance? Is it a shock?
Carpenter: Yes. At the time I thought Justice Brennan was making
some modest efforts to bring a little content to an area of law that
was, as Buzz said before, then quite formalist and in disarray. But I
was trying very hard really to hold the Court, that was the number
one objective when you were working on an opinion for Justice
Brennan, to produce an opinion that at least five Justices would join
that would hold the court. As I noted, other clerks had told me that
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the opinion better not say very much before I started work on the
draft and in fact after it was circulated, Justice Stewart's clerk read it
and said he was pretty sure it doesn't say anything at all. [Laughter]
Thompson: The question, again, is whether I am surprised by the
lasting impact of the dissent, right? [Laughter] No, I'm not surprised
that the majority opinion has had lasting significance. I actually
think that it's an amazingly well crafted majority opinion, and its
staying power is the result of two things. The first is that it does say
something. It could have been an opinion that was five pages long,
cited a couple of cases in support, and said we rule in favor of New
York City. But it didn't. It went on to lay out a balancing test and to
try to give some sense of what goes into that balancing test. And yet
at the same time, because it was written to try to hold together a ma-
jority, it sets out a test which is appealing to a large number of
judges. And so it's not at all surprising that as courts have wrestled
with takings issues and found them as difficult as they are, they fre-
quently find themselves coming back to Penn Central which appears
to offer a refuge for virtually everyone - and in the process maybe
doesn't say anything at all.
Lazarus: We have just a little time for questions.
Audience: I know that in the preservation movement the demoli-
tion of Penn Station was very powerful in getting things going. How
much did the ghost of that demolition have an impact on the legal
process, if any? Were people aware of it and aware of the reaction
of people to the destruction of that station and its beauty and seeing
the possibility that might come along with Grand Central and similar
places?
Carpenter: Yes, that was mentioned in all the amicus briefs and it
was mentioned prominently in all the law review articles that I re-
member reading. I think the opinion reflects that one of the reasons
for the historic preservation movement was that some very important
buildings had been destroyed. I don't remember anybody talking
about that building in particular but certainly the fact that buildings
that were important had been destroyed was something that we were
all aware of.
Audience: There has been a story that has been related at endless
takings conferences for at least a decade as to the origin of the rea-
sonable investment backed expectations doctrine and the story goes
Brennan's clerk was unsure what to do and he phoned a friend or he
called someone called Frank Michelman at Harvard and Frank
Michelman said, I wrote a law review article in '67 where I
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unleashed upon the world this new concept of investment backed
expectations. Is there any truth to that story?
Carpenter: Not as stated. [Laughter]. No, when I was a law stu-
dent taking constitutional law with Henry Monaghan we spent a lot
of time on the takings clause. I studied Michelman's article then - as
well as an article by Sax - but I thought as a law student that
Michelman, much more than Sax, had made a serious attempt to
make sense out of these decisions that were in quite a bit of disarray.
I reread both articles when working on the opinion - and cited them
both. The concept of "investment backed expectations" definitely
came from Michelman's article. But, no, I didn't call anyone at Har-
vard to talk about it while I was working on the draft opinion. Nor
did Justice Brennan. Michelman is a former clerk of Justice Bren-
nan, though.
Thompson: Did Frank Michelman call you? [Laughter]
Carpenter: No. But after the opinion came down, when I saw
Michelman at the Brennan clerk reunions, I actually thought of ask-
ing him what he thought about the Opinion. But I never have.
Audience: I wonder if we could tie this back to the discussion we
had yesterday and ask the panel to reflect upon how one deals with
perhaps unintended consequences of basically what are throw away
lines in an opinion. So David, you gave the example of the ques-
tions that went on at oral argument about the fact the original pro-
posal had 20 stories and Grand Central hadn't submitted requests to
take it down to 20 stories and that became very important in laying
the groundwork for what came later. We talked yesterday about the
throw away line in Agins about the substantially advance test and
that mischief that has done. I wonder if you could relate that to what
goes on in the drafting of opinions and also what counsel can do to
avoid that kind of language appearing in opinions that may do mis-
chief later on.
Carpenter: I didn't regard them as throw away lines at the time. I
mean Penn Central's argument was that the City had taken all its air
rights. But the proposal that had been made was to put a structure on
top of Grand Central that was architecturally very distinct from
Grand Central and the proposal was rejected for that reason. For all
we knew, if Penn Central had proposed a 55-story skyscraper on top
of Grand Central that used the same beaux arts or whatever it was,
architectural style, it might have been approved. Maybe that, too,
would have been dismissed as an aesthetic joke, but in the posture
that the case came to the Court, no one knew how such a proposal
would have been treated and Penn Central, at bottom, was making a
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very extreme claim that any restriction under landmark zoning law -
above and beyond those that the zoning laws imposed - constituted a
taking. And while it may not have been at all realistic for Penn Cen-
tral to have proposed everything imaginable to the Landmarks
Commission, the fact is that we didn't know with certainty that other
proposals that would have allowed some use of the air rights
wouldn't have been approved by the Landmarks Commission. So
particularly given the way the case was framed to us, I thought it was
an important point to make, particularly given my sense that it was
important to some of the justices to make the opinion as narrow as
possible. And Mr. Gribbon really had no choice when he was asked
about this at oral argument because no one had ever proposed to the
Landmarks Commission a 20-story addition above the terminal.
And maybe they would have turned it down because they wanted a
park above the terminal but certainly the Court didn't know about
that and Mr. Gribbon wasn't in a position to say that they certainly
would have turned it down.
Gribbon: I want to add that I think the idea that we could have had
approval of a 20-story building is pure fantasy. There was no indica-
tion on the part of the Landmark Commission that they were going
to permit anything on top of Grand Central. As the chairman said,
we have created a public park. I think the dissent got it right there
where they pointed out that Penn Central had spent years and lots of
money with two quite different designs from a noted architect to try
to satisfy the Landmark Commission whose answer was no, no, no,
this is going to be a public park.
Lazarus: One other thing that is interesting about the Court's opin-
ion is how the "economically viable use test" appears to result from a
concession at oral argument and looks like it's a throw away line.
But, if you look at the oral argument transcript you find out it was
anything but an incidental statement. A central part of the City's
argument throughout the Supreme Court litigation was that depriva-
tion of all economically viable use would amount to a taking. I have
always had the sense it wasn't just happenstance that the reference to
that concession and the economically viable use test appears in the
last footnote in the opinion, that it was part of keeping the coalition
together. It's so striking to see just a few years later Justice Powell
writing the Agins decision for a unanimous Court following an April
argument. Powell's clerk has a 9-0 opinion and Powell takes that
test out of that Penn Central footnote, a footnote he helped create by
asking a whole series of pointed questions at oral argument in Penn
Central. The Justice takes it out in Agins, he elevates it to the text, he
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makes it the test, and then Scalia jumps on it a decade plus later in
the Lucas case.
Audience: Could we ask Lenny what he would change in terms of
what your view was and what the city's position would be today?
Koerner: The one difference is that, if you close the facilities, we
had conceded that that might be a change that would warrant some
relief. And now we know that there are many different things you
can do with a closed facility other than that particular use. I don't
think we would concede now, for example, if they closed the termi-
nal that they could just walk away and put something out. I want to
make one more comment just so you don't feel too sorry for Penn
Central. [Laughter] All along we had indicated that air rights, the
ability to transfer to an accommodating property was significant and
there was an issue with that. But you should know that at least on
this one thing we were a little bit prophetic in that most all of the air
rights have been sold by Penn Central and they have made tens of
millions of dollars by using the air rights on other properties within
the zoning resolutions. So both sides walked away fairly happy.
Gribbon: That's not quite right. I would like to suggest a possible
reply to you. If the case were to come before the Supreme Court
today I think there is a reasonable probability that it would have
gone the other way. We would have had the senior conservative Jus-
tice, Justice Rehnquist, the Chief Justice, the senior liberal justice,
Justice Stevens, and Justice Brennan would not be there. And I
think with the prominence that has come about for air rights we
would have stood a much better chance of getting one of the other
justices or two of the other justices to go along with us.
Lazarus: Thank you very much.
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